Julius Evola, The Misunderstandings of the New "Paganism", (extract)

Extract from "Grundrisse", 1942.

It is perhaps appropriate to point out the misunderstandings that are current at the moment in some radical circles, who believe that a solution lies in the direction of a new paganism. This misunderstanding is already visible in the use of terms such as "pagan" and "pagandom". I myself, having used these expressions as slogans in a book that was published in Italy in 1928, and in Germany in 1934, have cause for sincere regrets.

Certainly the word for pagan or heathen, paganus, appears in some ancient Latin writers such as Livy without an especially negative tone. But this does not alter the fact that with the arrival of the new faith, the word paganus became a decidedly disparaging expression, as used in early Christian apologetics. It derives from pagus, meaning a small town or village, so that paganus refers to the peasant way of thinking: an uncultured, primitive, and superstitious way. In order to promote and glorify the new faith, the apologists had the bad habit of elevating themselves through the denigration of other faiths. There was often a conscious and often systematic disparagement and misrepresentation of almost all the earlier traditions, doctrines, and religions, which were grouped under the contemptuous blanket-term of paganism or heathendom. To this end, the apologists obviously made a premeditated effort to highlight those aspects of the pre-Christian religions and traditions that lacked any normal or primordial character, but were clearly forms that had fallen into decay. Such a polemical procedure lead, in particular, to the characterization of whatever had preceded Christendom, and was hence non-Christian, as necessarily anti-Christian.

One should consider, then, that "paganism" is a fundamentally tendentious and artificial concept that scarcely corresponds to the historical reality of what the pre-Christian world always was in its normal manifestations, apart from a few decadent elements and aspects that derived from the degenerate remains of older cultures.

Once we are clear about this, we come today to a paradoxical realization: that this imaginary paganism that never existed, but was invented by Christian apologists, is now serving as the starting-point for certain so-called pagan circles, and is thus threatening for the first time in history to become a reality--no more and no less than that.

What are the main traits of today's pagan outlook, as its own apologists believe and declare them to be? The primary one is the imprisonment in Nature. All transcendence is totally unknown to the pagan view of life: it remains stuck in a mixture of Spirit and Nature, in an ambiguous unity of Body and Soul. There is nothing to its religion but a superstitious deification of natural phenomena, or of tribal energies promoted to the status of minor gods. Out of this there arises first of all a blood- and soil-bound particularism. Next comes a rejection of the values of personality and freedom, and a condition of innocence that is merely that of the natural man, as yet unawakened to any truly supra-natural calling. Beyond this innocence there is only lack of inhibition, "sin," and the pleasure of sinning. In other domains there is nothing but superstition, or a purely profane culture of materialism and fatalism. It is as though only the arrival of Christianity (ignoring certain precursors which are dismissed as insignificant) allowed the world of supra-natural freedom to break through, letting in grace and personality, in contrast to the fatalistic and nature-bound beliefs ascribed to "paganism," bringing with it a catholic ideal (in the etymological sense of universality) and a healthy dualism, which made it possible to subjugate Nature to a higher law, and for the "Spirit" to triumph over the law of flesh, blood, and the false gods.

These are the main traits of the dominant understanding of paganism, i.e., of everything that does not entail a specifically Christian world-view. Anyone who possesses any direct acquaintance with cultural and religious history, however elementary, can see how incorrect and one-sided this attitude is. Besides, in the early Church Fathers there are often signs of a higher understanding of the symbols, doctrines, and religions of preceding cultures. Here we will give only a sampling.

What most distinguished the pre-Christian world, in all its normal forms, was not the superstitious divinization of nature, but a symbolic understanding of it, by virtue of which (as I have often emphasized) every phenomenon and every event appeared as the sensible revelation of a supra-sensible world. The pagan understanding of the world and of man was essentially marked by sacred symbolism.

Moreover, the pagan way of life was absolutely not that of a mindless innocence, nor a natural abandonment to the passions, even if certain forms of it were obviously degenerate. It was already aware of a healthy dualism, which is reflected in its universal religious or metaphysical conceptions. Here we can mention the dualistic warrior-religion of the ancient Iranian Aryans, already discussed and familiar to all; the Hellenistic antithesis between the "two natures," between World and Underworld, or the Nordic one between the race of the Ases and the elementary beings; and lastly the Indo-Aryan contrast between sams'ra, the "stream of forms," and m(o)kthi, "liberation" and "perfection."

On this basis, all the great pre-Christian cultures shared the striving for a supra-natural freedom, i.e., for the metaphysical perfection of the personality, and they all acknowledged Mysteries and initiations. I have already pointed out that the Mysteries often signified the reconquest of the primordial state, the spirituality of the solar, Hyperborean races, on the foundation of a tradition and a knowledge that were concealed through secrecy and exclusivity from the pollutions of an environment already in decay. We have also seen that in the Eastern lands, the Aryan quality was already associated with a "second birth" achieved through initiation. As for natural innocence as the pagan cult of the body, that is a fairy-tale and not even in evidence among savages, for despite the inner lack of differentiation already mentioned in connection with races "close to nature," these people inhibit and constrict their lives though countless taboos in a way that is often stricter than the morality of the so-called "positive religions." And as for that which seems to the superficial view to embody the prototype of such "innocence," namely the classical ideal, that was no cult of the body: it did not belong on that side of the body-spirit duality, but on the other side. As alreay stated, the classic ideal is that of a Spirit that is so dominant that under certain favorable spiritual conditions it molds Body and Soul to its own image, and thereby achieves a perfect harmony between the inner and the outer.

Lastly, there is an aspiration away from particularism to be found everywhere in the "pagan" world, to which was due the imperial summons that marked the ascending phase of the Nordic-derived races. Such a summons was often metaphysically enhanced and refined, and appeared as the natural consequence of the expansion of the ancient sacred state-concept; also as the form in which the victorious presence of the "higher world" and the paternal, Olympian principle sought to manifest itself in the world of becoming. In this respect we might recall the old Iranian concept of Empire and of the "King of kings," with its associated doctrine of the hvarenÙ (the "celestial glory" with which the Aryan rulers were endowed), and the Indo-Aryan tradition of the "World-king" or cakravartÓ, etc., right up to the reappearance of these signifiers in the "Olympian" assumptions of the ancient Roman idea of State and Empire. The Roman Empire, too, had its sacred contents, which were systematically misunderstood or undervalued not only by Christendom, but also by the writers of "positive" history. Even the Emperor-cult had the sense of a hierarchical unity at the top of a pantheon, which was a series of separate territorial and ancestral cults belonging to the non-Roman peoples, which were freely respected so long as they kept within their normal boundaries. Finally, concerning the "pagan" unity of the two powers, spiritual and temporal, this was very far from meaning that they were fused as a "solar" race understood it, it expressed the superior rights that must accrue to the spiritual authority at the center of any normal state; thus it was something quite different from the emancipation and "supremacy" of a merely secular state. If we were to make similar amendments in the spirit of true objectivity, the possibilities would be overwhelming.


Further Misunderstandings Concerning the "Pagan" World-View

This having been said, there remains the real possibility of transcending certain aspects of Christianity. But one must be quite clear: the Latin term "transcendere" means literally leaving something behind as one rises upwards, and not downwards! It is worth repeating that the principal thing is not the rejection of Christianity: it is not a matter of showing the same incomprehension towards it as Christianity itself has shown, and largely continues to show, towards ancient paganism. It would rather be a matter of completing Christianity by means of a higher and an older heritage, eliminating some of its aspects and emphasizing other, more important ones, in which this faith does not necessarily contradict the universal concepts of pre-Christian spirituality.

This, alas, is not the path taken by the radical circles we have mentioned. Many of these neo-pagans seem to have fallen into a trap deliberately set for them, often ending up by advocating and defending ideas that more or less correspond to that invented, nature-bound, particularistic pagandom, lacking light and transcendence, which was the polemical creation of a Christian misunderstanding of the pre-Christian world, and which is based, at most, on a few scattered elements of that world in its decline and devolution. And as if this were not enough, people often resort to an anti-Catholic polemic which, whatever its political justification, often drags out and adapts the old clichès of a purely modern, rationalist and enlightenment type that have been well-used by Liberalism, Democracy, and Freemasonry. This was also the case, to a degree, with H. S. Chamberlain, and it appears again in a certain Italian movement that has been trying to connect racial thinking with the "idealistic" doctrine of immanence.
There is a general and unmistakable tendency in neo-paganism to create a new, superstitious mysticism, based on the glorification of immanence, of Life and Nature, which is in the sharpest contrast to that Olympian and heroic ideal of the great Aryan cultures of pre-Christian antiquity. It would indicate much more a turning towards the materialistic, maternal, and telluric side, if it did not exhaust itself in foggy and dilettantish philosophizing. To give an example, we might ask what exactly is meant by this "Nature," on which these groups are so keen? It is little use to point out that it is certainly not the Nature that was experienced and recognized by ancient, traditional man, but a rational construct of the French Encyclopedist period. It was the Encyclopedists who, with definitely subversive and revolutionary motives, made up the myth of Nature as "good," wise, and wholesome, in opposition to the rottenness of every human "Culture." Thus we can see that the optimistic nature-myth of Rousseau and the Encyclopedists marches in the same ranks as "natural right," universalism, liberalism, humanitarianism, and the denial of any positive and structured form of sovereignty. Moreover, the myth in question has absolutely no basis in natural history. Every honest scientist knows that there is no room for "Nature" in the framework of his theories, which have as their object the determination of purely abstract equivalences and mathematical relationships. As far as biological research and genetics are concerned, we can already see the disequilibrium that would occur the moment one held certain laws to be final, when they only apply to a partial aspect of reality. What people call "Nature" today has nothing to do with what nature meant to the traditional, solar man, or to the knowledge of it that was accessible to such a man thanks to his Olympian and regal position. There is no sign of this whatever in the advocates of this new mysticism.
Misunderstandings of more or less the same kind. arise regarding political thought. Paganism is here often used as the synonym for a merely worldly and yet exclusive concept of sovereignty, which turns the relationships upside-down. We have already seen that in the ancient states, the unity of the two powers meant something quite different. It provided the basis for the spiritualization of politics, whereas neo-paganism results in actually politicizing the spiritual, and thereby treading once again the false path of the Gallicans and Jacobins. In contrast, the ancient concept of State and Empire always showed a connection to the Olympian idea.

What shall we think of the attitude that regards Jewry, Rome, the Catholic Church, Freemasonry, and Communism as more or less one and the same thing, just because their presuppositions differ from the plain thinking of the Folk? The Folk's thinking along these lines threatens to lose itself in the dark, where no differentiation is possible any more. It shows that it has lost the genuine feeling for the hierarchy of values, and that it cannot escape the crippling alternative of destructive internationalism and nationalistic particularism, whereas the traditional understanding of the Empire is superior to both these concepts.
To restrict ourselves to a single example: Catholic dogmatism actually fulfils a useful preventive role by stopping worldly mysticism and suchlike eruptions from below from passing a certain frontier; it makes a strong dam that protects the area where transcendent knowledge and the genuinely supra-natural and non-human elements reign--or at least where they should reign. One may well criticize the way in which such transcendence and knowledge have been understood in Christianity, but one cannot cross over to a "profane" criticism that seizes on some polemical weapon or other, fantasizes over the supposed Aryan nature of the immanence-doctrine, of "natural religion," the cult of "life," etc., without really losing one's level: in short, one does not thereby attain the world of primordial beginnings, but that of the Counter-Tradition or the telluric and primitive modes of being. This would in fact be the very best way of re-converting those people with the best "pagan" talents to Catholicism!

One must be wary of falling into the misunderstandings and errors that we have mentioned, which basically serve only to defend the common enemy. One must try to develop the capacity to place oneself at that level where didactic confusion cannot reach, and where all dilettantism and arbitrary intellectual activity are excluded; where one resists energetically every influence from confused, passionate desires and from the aggressive pleasure in polemics; where, finally and fundamentally, nothing counts but the precise, strict, objective knowledge of the spirit of the Primordial Tradition.

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Koenraad Elst , The Caste System, (full text)

In an inter-faith debate, most Hindus can easily be put on the defensive with a single word-caste. Any anti-Hindu polemist can be counted on to allege that "the typically Hindu caste system is the most cruel apartheid, imposed by the barbaric white Aryan invaders on the gentle dark-skinned natives." Here's a more balanced and historical account of this controversial institution.


Merits of the Caste System

The caste system is often portrayed as the ultimate horror. Inborn inequality is indeed unacceptable to us moderns, but this does not preclude that the system has also had its merits.

Caste is perceived as an "exclusion-from," but first of all it is a form of "belonging-to," a natural structure of solidarity. For this reason, Christian and Muslim missionaries found it very difficult to lure Hindus away from their communities. Sometimes castes were collectively converted to Islam, and Pope Gregory XV (1621-23) decreed that the missionaries could tolerate caste distinction among Christian converts; but by and large, caste remained an effective hurdle to the destruction of Hinduism through conversion. That is why the missionaries started attacking the institution of caste and in particular the brahmin caste. This propaganda has bloomed into a full-fledged anti-brahminism, the Indian equivalent of anti-Semitism.

Every caste had a large measure of autonomy, with its own judiciary, duties and privileges, and often its own temples. Inter-caste affairs were settled at the village council by consensus; even the lowest caste had veto power. This autonomy of intermediate levels of society is the antithesis of the totalitarian society in which the individual stands helpless before the all-powerful state. This decentralized structure of civil society and of the Hindu religious commonwealth has been crucial to the survival of Hinduism under Muslim rule. Whereas Buddhism was swept away as soon as its monasteries were destroyed, Hinduism retreated into its caste structure and weathered the storm.
Caste also provided a framework for integrating immigrant communities: Jews, Zoroastrians and Syrian Christians. They were not only tolerated, but assisted in efforts to preserve their distinctive traditions.


Typically Hindu?

It is routinely claimed that caste is a uniquely Hindu institution. Yet, counter examples are not hard to come by. In Europe and elsewhere, there was (or still is) a hierarchical distinction between noblemen and commoners, with nobility only marrying nobility. Many tribal societies punished the breach of endogamy rules with death.

Coming to the Indian tribes, we find Christian missionaries claiming that "tribals are not Hindus because they do not observe caste." In reality, missionary literature itself is rife with testimonies of caste practices among tribals. A spectacular example is what the missions call "the Mistake:" the attempt, in 1891, to make tribal converts in Chhotanagpur inter-dine with converts from other tribes. It was a disaster for the mission. Most tribals renounced Christianity because they chose to preserve the taboo on inter-dining. As strongly as the haughtiest brahmin, they refused to mix what God hath separated.

Endogamy and exogamy are observed by tribal societies the world over. The question is therefore not why Hindu society invented this system, but how it could preserve these tribal identities even after outgrowing the tribal stage of civilization. The answer lies largely in the expanding Vedic culture's intrinsically respectful and conservative spirit, which ensured that each tribe could preserve its customs and traditions, including its defining custom of tribal endogamy.


Description and History

The Portuguese colonizers applied the term caste, "lineage, breed," to two different Hindu institutions: jati and varna. The effective unit of the caste system is the jati, birth-unit, an endogamous group into which you are born, and within which you marry. In principle, you can only dine with fellow members, but the pressures of modern life have eroded this rule. The several thousands of jatis are subdivided in exogamous clans, gotra. This double division dates back to tribal society.

By contrast, varna is the typical functional division of an advanced society-the Indus/Saraswati civilization, 3rd millennium, bce. The youngest part of the Rg-Veda describes four classes: learned brahmins born from Brahma's mouth, martial kshatriya-born from his arms; vaishya entrepreneurs born from His hips and shudra workers born from His feet. Everyone is a shudra by birth. Boys become dwija, twice-born, or member of one of the three upper varnas upon receiving the sacred thread in the upanayana ceremony.

The varna system expanded from the Saraswati-Yamuna area and got firmly established in the whole of Aryavarta (Kashmir to Vidarbha, Sindh to Bihar). It counted as a sign of superior culture setting the arya, civilized, heartland apart from the surrounding mleccha, barbaric, lands. In Bengal and the South, the system was reduced to a distinction between brahmins and shudras. Varna is a ritual category and does not fully correspond to effective social or economic status. Thus, half of the princely rulers in British India were shudras and a few were brahmins, though it is the kshatriya function par excellence. Many shudras are rich, many brahmins impoverished.

The Mahabharata defines the varna qualities thus: "He in whom you find truthfulness, generosity, absence of hatred, modesty, goodness and self-restraint, is a brahmana. He who fulfills the duties of a knight, studies the scriptures, concentrates on acquisition and distribution of riches, is a kshatriya. He who loves cattle-breeding, agriculture and money, is honest and well-versed in scripture, is a vaishya. He who eats anything, practises any profession, ignores purity rules, and takes no interest in scriptures and rules of life, is a shudra." The higher the varna, the more rules of self-discipline are to be observed. Hence, a jati could collectively improve its status by adopting more demanding rules of conduct, e.g. vegetarianism.

A person's second name usually indicates his jati or gotra. Further, one can use the following varna titles: Sharma (shelter, or joy) indicates the brahmin, Varma (armour) the kshatriya, Gupta (protected) the vaishya and Das (servant) the shudra. In a single family, one person may call himself Gupta (varna), another Agrawal (jati), yet another Garg (gotra). A monk, upon renouncing the world, sheds his name along with his caste identity.


Untouchability

Below the caste hierarchy are the untouchables, or harijan (literally "God's people"), dalits ("oppressed"), paraiah (one such caste in South India), or scheduled castes. They make up about 16% of the Indian population, as many as the upper castes combined.

Untouchability originates in the belief that evil spirits surround dead and dying substances. People who work with corpses, body excretions or animal skins had an aura of danger and impurity, so they were kept away from mainstream society and from sacred learning and ritual. This often took grotesque forms: thus, an untouchable had to announce his polluting proximity with a rattle, like a leper.

Untouchability is unknown in the Vedas, and therefore repudiated by neo-Vedic reformers like Dayanand Saraswati, Narayan Guru, Gandhiji and Savarkar. In 1967, Dr. Ambedkar, a dalit by birth and fierce critic of social injustice in Hinduism and Islam, led a mass conversion to Buddhism, partly on the (unhistorical) assumption that Buddhism had been an anti-caste movement. The 1950 constitution outlawed untouchability and sanctioned positive discrimination programs for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Lately, the Vishva Hindu Parishad has managed to get even the most traditionalist religious leaders on the anti-untouchability platform, so that they invite harijans to Vedic schools and train them as priests. In the villages, however, pestering of dalits is still a regular phenomenon, occasioned less by ritual purity issues than by land and labor disputes. However, the dalits' increasing political clout is accelerating the elimination of untouchability.


Caste Conversion

In the Mahabharata, Yuddhishthira affirms that varna is defined by the qualities of head and heart, not by one's birth. Krishna teaches that varna is defined by one's activity (karma) and quality (guna). Till today, it is an unfinished debate to what extent one's "quality" is determined by heredity or by environmental influence. And so, while the hereditary view has been predominant for long, the non-hereditary conception of varna has always been around as well, as is clear from the practice of varna conversion. The most famous example is the 17th-century freedom fighter Shivaji, a shudra who was accorded kshatriya status to match his military achievements. The geographical spread of Vedic tradition was achieved through large-scale initiation of local elites into the varna order. From 1875 onwards, the Arya Samaj has systematically administered the "purification ritual" (shuddhi) to Muslim and Christian converts and to low-caste Hindus, making the dwija. Conversely, the present policy of positive discrimination has made upper-caste people seek acceptance into the favored Scheduled Castes.

Veer Savarkar, the ideologue of Hindu nationalism, advocated intermarriage to unify the Hindu nation even at the biological level. Most contemporary Hindus, though now generally opposed to caste inequality, continue to marry within their respective jati because they see no reason for their dissolution.


Racial Theory of Caste

Nineteenth-century Westerners projected the colonial situation and the newest race theories on the caste system: the upper castes were white invaders lording it over the black natives. This outdated view is still repeated ad-nauseam by anti-Hindu authors: now that "idolatry" has lost its force as a term of abuse, "racism" is a welcome innovation to demonize Hinduism. In reality, India is the region where all skin color types met and mingled, and you will find many brahmins as black as Nelson Mandela. Ancient "Aryan" heroes like Rama, Krishna, Draupadi, Ravana (a brahmin) and a number of Vedic seers were explicitly described as being dark-skinned.

But doesn't varna mean "skin color?" The effective meaning of varna is "splendor, color," and hence "distinctive quality" or "one segment in a spectrum." The four functional classes constitute the "colors" in the spectrum of society. Symbolic colors are allotted to the varna on the basis of the cosmological scheme of "three qualities" (triguna): white is sattva (truthful), the quality typifying the brahmin; red is rajas (energetic), for the kshatriya; black is tamas (inert, solid), for the shudra; yellow is allotted to the vaishya, who is defined by a mixture of qualities.
Finally, caste society has been the most stable society in history. Indian communists used to sneer that "India has never even had a revolution." Actually, that is no mean achievement.

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Bibliografie Tage Lindbom

The Myth of Democracy, Paperback, 1996.

The Tares of the Good Grain, or the Kingdom of Man at the Hour of Reckoning, Paperback, 1983.

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Frithjof Schuon, Sophia Perennis and the theory of evolution and progress, (excerpts)

What is the evolutionist error?

Much could be said about the operations and modalities of Divine Omnipotence. In the case of miracles, God projects something of Himself into the world and modifies the natural course of things by His Presence. In other cases, which properly speaking do not fall outside the natural course of things, the Divine Presence is less direct or, if one prefers, more indirect, for the entry of God into the world cannot mean that the Divine Presence enters the world with its very substance, which would reduce the world to ashes. This amounts to saying that in the sphere of the manifestations of Divine Power, one has to distinguish between "horizontal" and "vertical" dimensions, the vertical being supernatural and the horizontal natural; for the materialists, only the horizontal dimension exists, and that is why they cannot conceive of causes which operate vertically and which for that very reason are non-existent for them, like the vertical dimension itself. (1) [Survey of Metaphysics and esoterism, p. 68-69].


The "stopgap" theory of transformist evolution

Man, like the Universe, is a fabric of determination and indetermination; the latter stemming from the Infinite and the former from the Absolute.

It may be objected that our preceding considerations on the human phenomenon are not an exposition of anthropology properly so called, since we offer no information on the "natural history" of man nor a fortiori on his biological origin, and so on. Now such is not our intention; we do not wish to deal with factors that escape our experience, and we are very far from accepting the "stopgap" theory of transformist evolutionism. Original man was not a simian being barely capable of speaking and standing upright; he was a quasi-immaterial being enclosed in an aura still celestial, but deposited on earth; an aura similar to the "chariot of fire" of Elijah or the "cloud" that enveloped Christ's ascension. That is to say, our conception of the origin of mankind is based on the doctrine of the projection of the archetypes ab intra; thus our position is that of classical emanationism - in the Neoplatonic or gnostic sense of the term - which avoids the pitfall of anthropomorphism while agreeing with the theological conception of creatio ex nihilo. Evolutionism is the very negation of the archetypes and consequently of the divine Intellect; it is therefore the negation of an entire dimension of the real, namely that of form, of the static, of the immutable; concretely speaking, it is as if one wished to make a fabric of the wefts only, omitting the warps.
Quite obviously, an anthropology is not complete if it does not take into account the spiritual dimension of man and therefore factors such as the eschatological hierarchy which we have just spoken, or of the analogous social functions. To say homo sapiens, is to say Homo religiosus; there is no man without God. [To have a center, Survey of Integral Anthropology, p. 50-51].


How should we represent creation or creations? as a process of transformism taking place in "matter"?

Creation - or "creations" - should then be represented not as a process of transformism taking place in "matter" in the naively empirical sense of the word, but rather as an elaboration by the life-principle, that is to say, something rather like the more or less discontinuous productions of the imagination: images arise in the soul from a non-formal substance with no apparent link between them; it is not the images which transform themselves, it is the animic substance which causes their arising and creates them. That man should appear to be the logical issue, not indeed of an evolution, but of a series of "sketches" more and more centered on the human form - sketches of which the apes seem to represent disparate vestiges - this fact, or this hypothesis, in no way signifies that there is any common measure, thus a kind of psychological continuity, between man and the anthropomorphic and in some sense "embryonic" bodies which may have preceded him. The coming of man is a sudden "descent" of the Spirit into a receptacle that is perfect and definitive because it conforms to the manifestation of the Absolute; the absoluteness of man is like that of the geometrical point, which, strictly speaking, is quantitatively unattainable starting from the circumference. (2) [Stations of Wisdom, p.89].


Naivety of transformist evolutionism

Transformist evolutionism offers a patent example of "horizontality" in the domain of the natural sciences, owing to the fact that it puts a biological evolution of "ascending" degrees in place of a cosmogonic emanation of "descending" degrees. (3) Similarly, modern philosophers - mutatis mutandis - replace metaphysical causality with "physical" and empirical causalities, which no doubt demands intelligence, but one that is purely cerebral. [Roots of the Human Condition, p. 5].


Mechanism and empirical appearance

There are two points to consider in created things, namely the empirical appearance and the mechanism; now the appearance manifests the divine intention, as we have stated above; the mechanism merely operates the mode of manifestation. For example, in man's body the divine intention is expressed by its form, its deiformity, (4) its symbolism and its beauty; the mechanism is its anatomy and vital functioning. The modern mentality, having always a scientific and "iconoclastic" tendency, tends to overaccentuate the mechanism to the detriment of the creative intention, and does so on all levels, psychological as well as physical; the result is a jaded and "demystified" mentality that is no longer "impressed" by anything.

By forgetting the divine intention - which nonetheless is apparent a priori - one ends in an emptiness devoid of all reference points and meaning, and in a mentality of nihilism and despair, if not of careless and brutal materialism. In the face of this deviation it is the child who is right when he believes that the blue sky above us is Paradise.
That there are sciences, including physical sciences, is in man's nature because it is in the nature of things; but it is quite as much in the nature of things that man is unable to unveil Isis and that he must not try to do so. Human science has limits of principle; what in traditional civilizations prevents man from overstepping these limits is his relationship with God, with all the consequences that this relationship implies. (5)


Science's planimetric view of objects

One point that certain physicists do not seem to understand is that the mechanism of the world can be neither purely deterministic nor a fortiori purely arbitrary. In reality, the universe is a veil woven of necessity and freedom, of mathematical rigor and musical play; every phenomenon participates in these two principles, which amounts to saying that everything is situated in two apparently divergent but at bottom concordant dimensions, exactly as the dimensions of space are concordant while giving rise to divergent appearances that are irreconcilable from the standpoint of a planimetric view of objects.(6)


"Horizontal" and "vertical" causes

Another point that moderns do not grasp, is that there is no reason for necessarily seeking the cause of a phenomenon on the plane where it is produced, and that on the contrary one has to consider the possibility of a non-material cause, above all when it is a question of a phenomenon whose beginning is unknown a priori, and unknowable materially, as is the origin of living beings. Transformist evolutionism is the classical example of the bias that invents "horizontal" causes because one does not wish to admit a "vertical" dimension: one seeks to extort from the physical plane a cause that it cannot furnish and that is necessarily situated above matter.

Even within the order of physical causes, one has to take into account the simultaneous presence of the immanent metaphysical Cause: if a seed is the immediate cause of a plant, it is because the divine archetype intervenes in the physical causality. Geometrically speaking, causes can be situated on the "concentric circles" that constitute the Universe, but other causes - and with all the more reason the First Cause - are situated at the Center and act through the radii emanating from it. The divine Intellect contains the archetypes of creation, and it is starting from this Cause - or from this causal system - at a given cyclic "moment" of the cosmogonic process, that the "ideas" are "incarnated" which will be manifested in the form of contingent creatures.

We do not ask physicists to be content with an anthropomorphic and naive creationism; but at least it would be logical on their part - since they aim at a total and flawless science - to try to understand the traditional ontocosmological doctrines, especially the Hindu doctrine of the "envelopes (kosha) of the Self (Atma) a doctrine that, precisely, presents the Universe as a system of circles proceeding from the Center-Principle to that extreme limit which for us is matter. For human science does not derive solely from the need to know and to register; more profoundly its origin is the thirst for the essential; now the sense of essentiality attracts us toward shores other than those of the limited plane of physical phenomena alone. [Roots of the Human Condition, p. 16-20].


Who proved the evolutionary theory and when has it been proven?

We shall no doubt be told that the reality of a creator God has not been demonstrated; however, aside from the fact it is not difficult to demonstrate this reality with arguments proportionate to its nature - but which for that very reason are inaccessible to certain minds - the least that can be said is that evolution has never been proved by anybody whatsoever, and with good reason; transformist evolution is accepted as a useful and provisional postulate, as one will accept no matter what, provided no obligation is felt to accept the primacy of the Immaterial since the latter escapes the control of our senses.

And yet, starting from the recognition of the immediately tangible mystery that is subjectivity or intelligence, it is easy to understand that the origin of the Universe is, not inert and unconscious matter, but a spiritual Substance which, from coagulation to coagulation and from segmentation to segmentation - and other projections both manifesting and limiting - finally produces matter by causing it to emerge from a more subtle substance, but one which is already remote from principial Substance.

It will be objected that there is no proof of this, to which we reply - aside from the phenomenon of subjectivity which precisely comprises this proof, leaving aside other possible intellectual proofs, not needed by Intellection - to which we reply then, that there are infinitely fewer proofs for this inconceivable absurdity, evolutionism, which has the miracle of consciousness springing from a heap of earth or pebbles, metaphorically speaking. [From the Divine to the Human, p. 5-6].


What would be the meaning of life if evolutionists were right?

In the beginning was the Spirit: hence the Word; for the Spirit, wanting and having to communicate itself because It is the Sovereign Good, brings about the manifestation of Its innumerable possibilities. The Spirit is both Light and Heat; the latter, life, is as miraculous as the former, intelligence, when we consider them on the plan of their earthly manifestation. Besides, to reduce all intelligence and all love to material causes is a way of not wanting to admit that our material existence is an exile; of wanting, on the contrary, to feel at ease in a world that presents itself as an end in itself, and which exempts man from the effort of transcending things and of transcending himself; whereas without this effort man bypasses the human vocation.

If the evolutionists are right, the human phenomenon is inexplicable and human life is not worth living. Moreover it is to theses conclusions that they arrive in the end, whence their axiom of the absurdity of existence; this is to say that they attribute to the object, which is inaccessible to them, the absurdity of the subject, which they have deliberately chosen by following the propensity towards not innocent, but human, animality. [From the Divine to the Human, p. 17].


About the metaphysically and physically aberrant imaginations of the evolutionists

The human form cannot be transcended, its sufficient reason being precisely to express the Absolute, hence the untranscendable; and this cuts short the metaphysically and physically aberrant imaginations of the evolutionists, according to whom this form would be the result of a prolonged elaboration starting from animal forms; an elaboration which is at once arbitrary and unlimited.

Materialists, even those who consider transformist evolution inexplicable and even contradictory, accept this hypothesis as an indispensable idea, which moreover carries us outside of science and into philosophy, or more exactly into rationalism with its reasonings cut off from the very roots of knowledge; and if the evolutionist idea is indispensable to them, it is because in their minds it replaces the concept of a sudden creation ex nihilo, which to them seems the only other possible solution.

In reality, the evolutionist hypothesis is unnecessary because the creationist concept is so as well; for the creature appears on earth, not by falling from heaven, but by progressively passing - starting from the archetype - from the subtle to the material world, materialization being brought about within a kind of visible aura quite comparable to the "spheres of light" which, according to many accounts, introduce and terminate celestial apparitions. [From the Divine to the Human, p. 88]


Is the ape there to show what man has been?

The ape, for example, is there to show what man is and what he is not, and certainly not to show what he has been; far from being able to be a virtual form of man, the ape incarnates an animal desire to be human, hence a desire of imitation and usurpation; but he finds itself as if before a closed door and falls back all the more heavily into its animality, the perfect innocence of which, it can no longer recapture, if one may make use of such a metaphor; it is as if the animal, prior to the creation of man and to protest against it, had wished to anticipate it, which evokes the refusal of Lucifer to prostrate before Adam. [From the Divine to the Human, p. 98]


Contradictions of the notion of evolution and progress

If man is a hypocrite, two options lie before us: either he is basically such, and then it would be impossible to remark the fact without going outside human nature by miraculous or Divine means; or else man is only accidentally and relatively hypocritical, in which case there was no need to wait for psychoanalysis to take account of the fact, since health is more fundamental to the nature of man than illness, and there have therefore always been men who could recognize evil and who knew the cure for it.

Or again, if man is profoundly sick, one cannot see why psychoanalysis should alone have been able to notice the fact and why its explanation, which is quite arbitrary and in fact essentially perverse, should alone be the right one.
One can obviously try to get round this by putting it down to the working of "evolution," but in that case one has to blind oneself both to the qualities of our ancestors and the vices of our contemporaries, to say nothing of the impossibility of demonstrating - or the absurdity of admitting - the possibility of a sudden burst of intellectual and moral objectivity in a process that is merely biological and quantitative.

For if a natural development were to lead up to a reflexive intelligence, to a sudden act of awareness that perceived the development for what it was, that outcome would be a reality falling entirely outside the realm of the evolutionary process; there would thus be no common measure between the act of awareness and the quite contingent movement that preceded it, and this movement, therefore, under no circumstances, could be the cause of the awareness in question.

This argument is the very negation of the theory of transformist evolution, and therefore of all such notions as those of man as a "link" or man as a product of chance; by the same token it also excludes any mystique of a generative matter, of a biosphere or noosphere or of a "point omega."' Man is what he is, or he is nothing; the capacity for objectivity and absoluteness inherent in thought proves the quasi-absolute or fixed and irreplaceable character of the thinking creature; this is what is meant by the Scriptural words "made in God's image." [Logic and Transcendence, p.12-13].


The evolutionary theory, a substitute for the traditional theory of emanation

In reality, the evolutionary theory,.., is a substitute for the traditional theory of emanation and consists in denying the periphery-center relationship.(7) Thus the very existence of the Center, source of emanation, and of the radii leading to it is denied, and an attempt is made to situate every hierarchical relationship on the curve marking the periphery.

Instead of proceeding upward, starting from the corporeal level and passing through the animic sphere, then mounting toward realities at first supraformal and finally principial or metacosmic, an evolving hierarchy is imagined, advancing from matter, through vegetable and animal life, to human consciousness, itself considered as some kind of transitory accident.

With a thoughtlessness that is infinitely culpable when they call themselves believers some people imagine a superman who is destined to take man's place, and who consequently would also render Christ's humanity contemptible (8); and a certain "genius" imagines at the end of the evolutionist and progressivist chain something he is not ashamed to call "God" and which is no more than a pseudoabsolute decked out in a pseudotranscendence; for the Eternal will always be Alpha and has always been Omega. Creatures are crystallized in the corporeal zone emanating, in a manner at once, continuous and discontinuous, from the Center and from on high; they do not "evolve" by coming from matter and so from the periphery and from below. But at the same time, and beyond reach of our human point of view, creatures are all "contained" in God and do not really come out from Him; the whole play of relationships between God and the world is but a monologue of relativity. [Logic and Transcendence, p.68-69].


About the evolutionist prejudice

Evolutionism, ..., provides a typical example of reasoning in the absence of sufficient premises. Modern scientism starts from the gratuitous and crude axiom that there is no reality outside sensorial, or virtually sensorial experience with the highly relative exception of psychology, a very limited domain which, in any case, can be reduced philosophically to a subtle mode of the sensorial; and since it starts from this axiom, it will reason in accordance therewith, leaving out of account premises that surpass it.

Now in the case of a reality that does surpass the sensorial and empirical order, any such reasoning must evidently be false - as well might one reason about a sparrow while denying the existence of birds - and it will demonstrate its falsity by replacing the missing premises by purely functional hypotheses; and these hypotheses will betray their chimerical nature by their monstrousness, as witness the concepts of the ape-man or of "hominization". All this is truly sinister if one considers that the essential truth has reference, on the one hand, to the transcendent Absolute and, on the other, to the suprasensible cosmos, or to the extrasensorial character of the greater part of the cosmos, including our souls which, precisely, appertain to this order. [Logic and Transcendence, p.93-94].


Importance of matter for evolutionists

At first sight, it might be thought that the end result of the cosmogonic projection is matter, which in fact appears as the "final point" of the existentiating trajectory; but it is so only in a certain respect, that of the cosmic Substance, of which it is the most exteriorized and contingent mode; it is such at least for our sensorial world, for one can conceive of indefinitely more "solidified" substances than the matter pertaining to our spatial cosmos (9).


In which case evolutionism would evolutionism be justified?

Since we alluded above to the evolutionist prejudice, it will be permissible here to say a few more words on the subject: evolutionism would be justified if a tree could produce something other and better than what is contained in its seed; it would be justified if the fruits of the tree were, not the manifestation of what the seed already contains, but the result of an evolution that is unforeseeable and variable according to circumstances, or if it were a matter of chance whether an apple tree bears apples and not figs.

The phenomena of evolution and transmutation exist within the limits of certain contingencies, otherwise the seed would never become a tree and a plant would never modify its shape under given conditions, such as a change of soil or climate; but these two factors - evolution and transmutation - are altogether secondary in relation to the principle of qualitative anticipation of effects within their own cause. These truths assume a particular importance when it is a question of Revelations and traditions, for the slightest error on this plane can be devastating to the soul and to the intelligence. [Treasures of Buddhism, p27].

About the notion of progress
In any case people today far too readily include under the common denomination of want or misery both an ancestral simplicity of life and mere lack of food, and the continual confusing of these two things is far from unbiased; the catchword "under-developed countries" is from this point of view highly significant in its blatant perfidy. A scientific machine-age standard of living has been invented and the aim is to impose this on all peoples (10), above all on those who are classed as 'backward' whether they be Hindus or Hottentots. For these believers in progress happiness means a host of noisy and ponderous complications calculated to crush out many elements of beauty and so also of well-being; when they want to abolish such and such 'fanaticisms' and 'horrors' these people forget that there are also atrocities on the spiritual plane and that the so-called humanitarian civilization of the moderns is saturated with them.

In order to be able to judge of the quality of happiness in some past state of the world one would have to be able to put oneself in the place of the men who lived in it and adopt their way of evaluating things and so also their imaginative and sentimental reflexes; many things to which we have become accustomed would seem to them intolerable restraints to which they would prefer the more familiar risks; just the ugliness and the atmosphere of triviality of the world of today would seem to them like the worst of nightmares.

History as such cannot give a full account of the soul of some distant epoch: it chiefly registers calamities, leaving aside all the static factors of happiness; it has been said that happiness has no history, and this is profoundly true. Wars and epidemics no more reflect than do certain customs the happy aspects of the lives of our ancestors, while their literary and artistic works plainly do so. Even if one supposes that history could tell one nothing about the happiness of the Middle Ages, the cathedrals and other artistic manifestations of the mediaeval world provide an indisputable witness to that happiness in the sense that (to put it at its lowest) they do not give the impression of a humanity more unhappy than that of today; like the Orientals of old the ancestors of the present Europeans would no doubt have preferred, given the choice, to be unhappy after their own fashion than happy after ours.

There is nothing human which is not an evil from some point of view: even tradition itself is in certain respects an 'evil', since it must handle evil things in man and these human ills invade it in their turn, but it is then a lesser evil and, humanly speaking, it would obviously be far truer to call it a 'good'. The pure truth is that 'God alone is good' and that every earthly thing has some ambiguous side to it.

No doubt some will say that humanitarianism, far from being materialistic by definition, aims at reforming human nature by education and legislation; now it is contradictory to want to reform the human outside the divine since the latter is the essence of the former; to make the attempt is in the end to bring about miseries far worse than those from which one was trying to escape.

Philosophical humanitarianism underestimates the immortal soul just because it overestimates the human animal; it compels people even to denigrate saints that they may the better be able to whitewash criminals; the one seems unable to go without the other. From this results oppression of those of contemplative bent from their most tender years: in the name of egalitarianism vocations are blurred and geniuses are worn down, by schools in particular and by official worldliness in general; every spiritual element is banished from professional and public life (11) and this amounts to removing from life a great part of its content and condemning religion to a slow death.

The modern levelling - which may call itself 'democratic'- is the very opposite of the theocratic equality of the monotheistic religions, for it is founded, not on the theomorphisrn of man, but on his animality and his rebellion.
Besides, the thesis of indefinite progress comes up against the following contradiction: if man has been able to exist for thousands of years while under the domination of errors and stupidities - always supposing that the traditions are merely such, in which case the error and stupidity would be well-nigh measureless - the immensity of this deception would be incompatible with the intelligence with which man as such is credited and with which he must be credited.
In other words, if man is intelligent enough to arrive at the 'progress' which our period embodies - assuming there is any reality in such progress - then man must have been a priori too intelligent to remain for thousands of years the dupe of errors as ridiculous as those which modern progressivism attributes to him; and if he is on the contrary stupid enough to have believed in them so long, then he must also be too stupid to escape from them.

Again, if present-day man had at long last arrived at truth, he would have to be proportionately superior to the men of former times, and the disproportion between the two would be well-nigh absolute. Now the least that can be said is that the men of ancient or mediaeval times were neither less intelligent nor less virtuous than modern man. The ideology of progress is one of those absurdities that are as remarkable for the lack of imagination as for the total lack of sense of proportion they display; this is, moreover, essentially a vaishya illusion, rather like that of 'culture', which is nothing more than intellectuality stripped of intelligence. [Castes and Races, p.28-30].


Endnotes:

(1) It may be pointed out here that the evolutionist error has its roots in this prejudice. Instead of conceiving that creatures are archetypes "incarnated" in matter, starting from the Divine Intellect and passing through a subtle or animic plane, they restrict all causality to the material world, deliberately ignoring the flagrant contradictions implied by this conceptual "planimetry."

(2) The same thing is repeated in the womb: as soon as the body is formed the immortal soul is suddenly fixed in it like a flash of lightning, so that there is complete discontinuity between this new being and the embryonic phases which have prepared its coming. It has quite rightly been maintained, against transformism, not only that "the greater cannot come from the less" (Guénon), but also that even though something existent may gain more precision or become atrophied, there cannot on the other hand be a motive, in a species, for the adjunction of a new element, not to mention that nothing could guarantee the hereditary character of such an element (according to Schubert-Soldern).

(3) We understand the term "emanation" in the Platonic sense: the starting point remains transcendent, hence unaffected, whereas in deist or naturalist emanationism the cause pertains to the same ontological order as the effect.

(4) We should specify: total or integral deiformity, for in animals too there is - or can be - a deiformity, but it is partial; similarly for plants, minerals, elements and other orders of phenomena.

(5) Although a believer, Pasteur is supposed to have said that when entering his laboratory he left God outside; be that as it may, this plainly shows the false realism of scientists, while at the same time - in a quite different respect - it demonstrates the inferiority complex of those who are still believers towards the apparently victorious rationalists.

(6) Let us take the example of the human body: its principial form, which cannot be other than what it is, stems from the Absolute and from necessity, whereas its actual form - a particular body, and not the body as such which gives rise to innumerable variations, stems from the Infinite and from freedom. Its principial form is as it were mathematical, it is measurable; on the contrary, its actual form is as it were musical, its beauty is unfathomable. Anatomy has its limits, beauty does not; but beauty can be relative, whereas anatomy cannot.

(7) This must not, of course, be confused with the emanationist heresy, which has nothing metaphysical about it and which reduces the Principle to the level of manifestation, or Substance to the level of accidents.

(8) For God only manifests himself directly in a support which by definition marks the presence of the Absolute in relativity and is for this reason "relatively absolute." This "relative absoluteness" is the justification of the possibility Homo Sapiens Man might disappear, if God so wished, but he could not change into another species; the Platonic ideas are precise possibilities and not just misty vagueness: every possibility is what it is and what it ought to be.

(9) For the evolutionists, this matter is the very theater - or the initial substance - of universal Possibility; gratuitous concepts such as those of the biosphere or of the "noosphere" add nothing that could attenuate this error whose effects are incalculable.

(10) The Sankaracarya of Kañci has pointed out ... that 'the very idea of raising the standard of living ... will have the most injurious effects on society. Raising the standards of living means tempting people to encumber themselves with more luxuries and thus leading them ultimately to real poverty in spite of increased production. Aparigraha meant that every man should take from nature only so much as is required for his life in this world.'

(11) On the other hand, by a kind of compensation, professional life more and more assumes a "religious" air in the sense that it claims the whole of man, his soul as well as his time, as though the sufficient reason for the human condition were some economic enterprise and not immortality.

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Bibliography Philip Sherrard

The Greek east and the Latin West: a study in the Christian tradition. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Athos, the Mountain of Silence, London: Oxford University Press.

Constantinople. Iconography of a sacred city,London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Byzantium. New York: Time-Life Books, 1966.

With John Campbell. Modern Greece. New York, Praeger, 1968 / London: Benn, 1968.

W. B. Yeats & the search for tradition. Ipswich: Golgonooza Press, 1975.

Christianity and Eros: essays on the theme of sexual love. London: S.P.C.K., 1976.

Church, papacy, and schism: a theological enquiry. London: S.P.C.K., 1978.

The wound of Greece: studies in neo-Hellenism. London: Collings, 1978, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

The rape of man and nature: an enquiry into the origins and consequences of modern science. Ipswich, Suffolk: Golgonooza Press, 1987.

The sacred in life and art. Ipswich: Golgonooza Press, 1990.

Human image: world image. Ipswich: Golgonooza, 1992.

In the sign of the rainbow: selected poems, 1940-1989. London: Anvil Press Poetry, 1994.

Christianity: lineaments of a sacred tradition. Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998 / Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998.

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Mircea A. Tamas, Oriens and Occidens, (note de lectura)

Articol publicat pe www.regnabit.com
First question: why do we have this modern world?
Second question: why, when we say „modern society” do we think instantaneously at the Occident?
How much the West is the Occident and the East the Orient?
How much the Orient is still the Orient?
René Guénon used to say that there are not unsolvable problems, only problems wrongly put.
Orient contain three traditions: Far Eastern, Hindu and Islam.
Christian symbolism calls Jesus Christ Oriens, and not Occidens. The word Occidens is derived from the latin occido, which means to fall, to colapse.
„With regard to the doctrine of the cosmic cycles, we may say that the “Golden
Age” lasted four unites of time, the “Age of Silver” three, the “Age of Bronze” two and
the “Iron Age” will last one. On the other hand, the whole cycle can be considered as
containing five Great Years, in which case the “Golden Age” lasted two Great Years, the
“Age of Silver” one and a half Years, the “Age of Bronze” one Year and the “Iron Age”
would survive half a Year.”
Treta-Yuga (the Age of Silver), was the period of the ksatriyas revolt.
Dwapara-Yuga (the Age of Bronze), the period of giants.
The Hindu tradition is the direct successor of the primordial Tradition, the Hyperborean. The Atlantean tradition is the secondary successor. The former kept alive the initiatory center, the later manifested the counter-initiation.
„In the history of humanity we can find examples of people invading foreign territories and obliterating other civilizations. Each time it was a critical point of the cycle, when a change was needed. In the case of the Europeans, their expansion was part of the desecration of the world, aiming the supremacy of Occidens.”
There was not much difference between the Communist regime and the capitalism regarding to their antitraditionnal mentality.
About the counter-initiation: the great danger did not come from the enemy, but form the false friend, the inner adversary.
William B. Seabrook, Adventures in Arabia, Paragon House, 1991.
The Satan’s greatest ruse: to make the world believe that he doesn’t exist. Another one: that there is no more Tradition.

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Bibliography Michael Oren Fitzgerald

Yellowtail, Crow medicine man and Sun Dance chief: an autobiography. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

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Jean Baudrillard, La pensée radicale, (breviar de idei)

01. Constiinta noastrã nu este ecoul realitãtii, ci sfidarea ei. Constiinta este o iluzie obiectivã.

02. Postmodernitatea vrea sã institue realitatea ca pe ultimul dintre drepturile omului si ca pe primul bun de consum curent.

03. Nimeni nu poate supravietui (doar) în realitate.

04. Existã o gândire solidarã cu realul, care pleacã de la ipoteza cã existã un sens. Si mai existã o gândire care e ex-centricã realului, strãinã dialecticii si gândirii critice, ludicã. [Aceasta din urmã este numitã de Baudrillard “gândirea radicalã”.]

05. Gândirea si realul nu sunt compatibile. Lipseste între ele o punte de legãturã fireascã.

06. Postmodernitatea a ex-orbitat realul. În locul lui troneazã o simulare giganticã, atât tehnicã precum si mentalã. Postmodernitatea este o virtualitate autogenerativã.

07. Gândirea radicalã este o încrucisare violentã a sensului si a non-sensului, a adevãrului si a non-adevãrului, a continuitãtii lumii si a continuitãtii nimicului.

08. Discursului realului pariazã cã existã ceva descifrabil. Gândirea radicalã pariazã pe iluzia lumii, pe care vrea s-o restituie sub aparenta continuitate a sensului.

09. Vestile proaste ale post-modernitãtii: nulitatea valorilor, incertitudinea realului, non-locul unor evenimente.

10. Nimic nu e evident fãrã sã devinã enigmatic.

11. Realitatea e prea evidentã pentru a fi si adevãratã.

12. Pãcãleala si rãzbunarea realitãtii sunt perpetua ei supunere la toate ipotezele.

13. Prin gândire lumea se reveleazã ca iluzie.

14. Realitatea postmodernã este apocalipsa simulãrii. Ideea de simulacru a fost derobatã de realitate.

15. Nu teoriile sunt cele ce se adapteazã evenimentelor, ci dimpotrivã.

16. Dezordinea simulatã a postmodernitãtii a mers mai repede decât noi. Efectul de realitate s-a sters în fata anamorfozei vitezei.

17. Trãim în infernul realizãrii inconditionale a tuturor ideilor, infernul realului.

18. Exista cândva o putere a indiferentei într-o lume a diferentelor. Astãzi însã, într-o lume devenitã indiferentã, indiferenta noastrã ne-a fost furatã. Nici extravaganta gândirii nu mai are sens într-o lume extravagantã. Suntem orfani.

19. Gândirea radicalã nu este niciodatã depresivã. Sensul ei, da, analiza, si ea. Dar forma este fericitã, chiar dacã expune o lume fãrã iluzii si fãrã sperantã. Definitia gândirii radicale: inteligentã fãrã sperantã, într-o formã fericitã.

20. Scriitura este iluzia vie a sensului.

21. Toatã lumea are idei, chiar mai multe decât trebuie. Singurul lucru care conteazã e însã witz-ul, spiritualitatea limbii, si nu mizerabila obiectivitate criticã a ideilor.

22. Gândirea radicalã coincide cu utilizarea radicalã a limbii. Ea nu descifreazã nimic, este doar bunã conducãtoare de iluzie si non-sens.

23. Dacã vrea sã transmitã iluzie, limbajul trebuie sã devinã iluzie. Dacã vrea sã transmitã seductie, limbajul trebuie sã devinã seductie. Cât priveste transmiterea realului, acest lucru nu este niciodatã cu putintã.

24. Regula absolutã a gândirii este sã redea lumea asa cum i-a fost datã, ininteligibilã, chiar putin mai ininteligibilã dacã se poate.

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Jean Baudrillard, La pensée radicale, (note de lectura)

Paru chez Sens et Tonka, Editeurs, 1994.
Moto: « Le roman est une œuvre d’art non pas tellement par ses ressemblances inévitables avec la vie que par les différences incommensurables qui le séparent d’elle. » (Stevenson). D’où la formule de Baudrillard: « Ainsi la pensée ne vaut pas tellement par ses convergences inévitables avec la vérité que par les divergences incommensurables qui l’en séparent. » (p. 5)
Notre conscience n’est pas l’écho de la réalité, mais un défi à la réalité. La conscience tient de l’illusion objective, et non pas de la réalité objective.
La croyance à la réalité fait partie des formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.
Il y a une sorte de mépris dans l’intention charitable d’instituer la réalité comme le dernier des droits de l’homme ou le premier des biens de consommation courante. Personne ne vit uniquement dans la réalité, dans les preuves visibles de l’existence.

« Dites: je suis réel, ceci est réel, le monde est réel – personne ne rit. Dites: ceci est un simulacre, vous n’êtes qu’un simulacre, cette guerre est un simulacre – tout le monde s’esclaffe. D’un rire jaune ou condescendent, ou convulsif, comme devant une plaisanterie puérile ou une proposition obscène. Tout ce qui touche au simulacre est tabou ou obscène, comme ce qui concerne le sexe ou la mort. Pourtant ce sont plutôt la réalité et l’évidence qui sont obscènes. C’est la vérité qui devrait faire rire. » (p. 9)
Il existe une pensée solidaire du réel, qui part de l’hypothèse qu’il y a une référence réelle à l’idée (la perspective du sens et du déchiffrement). Une autre pensée est excentrique au réel. Celle-ci est étrangère à la dialectique et à la pensée critique (qui se réfère toujours à un idéal du réel). Elle est un jeu avec la réalité.
Il y a incompatibilité de la pensée et du réel. Il n’y a de l’une à l’autre aucune sorte de transition nécessaire ou naturelle.
La conjonction du réel avec l’idée n’a pas survécu à la sécularisation catastrophique dans toutes les politiques du XXème siècle. Aujourd’hui, la simulation est gigantesque, autant technique que mentale. Le virtuel est autonome, libéré du réel, autoréférentiel à l’infini. Le réel même est devenu extrême, exorbité, illusoire.
« […] la pensée radicale est au croisement violent du sens et du non-sens, de la vérité et de la non-vérité, de la continuité du monde et de la continuité du rien. » (p. 14)
Le discours du réel et du rationnel parie qu’il y a quelque chose de déchiffrable. La pensée radicale parie sur l’illusion du monde. Elle parie qu’il y a plutôt rien que quelque chose, et elle veut le restituer sous l’apparente continuité du sens.
« La prédiction radicale est toujours celle de la non-réalité des faits. » (p. 15)
Les mauvaises nouvelles de nos jours: la nullité de nos valeurs, l’incertitude du réel, le non-lieu de certains événements.
« Comme la photo (l’image) connote l’effacement, la mort de ce qu’elle représente, ce qui lui donne son intensité, ainsi ce qui fait l’intensité de l’écriture, que ce soit celle de la fiction ou de la fiction théorique, c’est le vide, c’est le néant en filigrane, c’est l’illusion du sens, c’est la dimension ironique du langage, corrélative de la dimension ironique des faits eux-mêmes, qui ne sont jamais que ce qu’ils sont – dans tous les sens: ils ne sont rien de plus que ce qu’ils sont, et ils ne sont jamais seulement ce qu’ils sont – amphibologie parfaite. » (p. 16)
Rien n’est d’une évidence totale sans devenir énigmatique.
La réalité est trop évidente pour être vraie.
La pensée qui parie sur le réel veut restituer une réalité objective de ce monde. La pensée radicale veut restituer l’illusion du monde, dont elle fait partie.
« Car la réalité ne demande qu’à se soumettre aux hypothèses, elle les vérifie toutes, c’est là d’ailleurs sa ruse et sa vengeance. » (p. 18)
La réalité est une illusion et toute pensée doit chercher d’abord à la démasquer.
Par la pensée, le monde doit se révéler non comme vérité, mais comme illusion.
« En fait, nous sommes les orphelins d’une réalité venue trop tard, et qui n’est elle-même, comme la vérité, qu’un constat à retardement. » (p. 20)
L’ennui avec la réalité, c’est qu’elle vérifie toutes les hypothèses, elle s’y plie. Le réel ne résiste pas, il n’est pas solide. La réalité est disposée à se plier en désordre. « Lorsque quelque idée un peu aventureuse, quelque hypothèse critique ou cynique s’avère être juste, c’est un tour pendable, vous êtes joué et désarmé avant la lamentable confirmation de vos dires par une réalité sans scrupules. » (p. 22)
Sur l’idée de simulacre et son contact avec la réalité: « Ainsi vous pouvez avancer l’idée de simulacre, et secrètement pourtant ne pas y croire, en espérant que le réel se venge – la théorie n’est pas forcément convaincue d’elle-même. Hélas, seuls les fanatiques de la réalité réagissent négativement, la réalité, elle, ne semble pas vouloir la démentir, bien au contraire: tous les simulacres s’y donnent libre cours. La réalité aujourd’hui n’est rien d’autre que l’apocalypse de la simulation. Si bien que les tenants de la réalité (qu’ils défendent comme une valeur morale ou une vertu) jouent en quelque sorte le rôle de ceux qu’on appelait jadis les fanatiques de l’Apocalypse. » (p. 23)
L’idée de simulacre a été dérobée par la réalité. Le simulacre est devenu réalité.
Le simulacre assure la continuité du réel.
« C’est là le paradoxe de toute pensée qui s’inscrit en faux contre la réalité – c’est quand celle-ci vous dérobe le concept en le réalisant. Et se dérobe du même coup à toute critique. » (p. 24)
Ce ne sont plus les théories qui s’adaptent aux événements, mais le contraire.
« Nous avons perdu cette avance des idées sur le monde, cette distance qui fait qu’une idée reste une idée. La pensée doit être anticipatrice, exceptionnelle et à la marge – l’ombre projetée des événements futurs. Or nous sommes aujourd’hui à la traîne des événements. Ils peuvent donner parfois l’impression de régresser, de ne pas être ce qu’ils devraient être. En fait, ils nous ont dépassés depuis longtemps. Le désordre simulé des choses est allé plus vite que nous. L’effet de réalité s’est effacé devant l’accélération – anamorphose de la vitesse. » (p. 25)
Nous vivons dans l’enfer, celui de la réalisation inconditionelle de toutes les idée, l’enfer du réel.
Jadis il existait une puissance de l’indifférence, par opposition au jeu des différences, qui est la caractéristique du monde. Dans un monde devenu indifférent, notre indifférence à nous nous a été volée. Ainsi l’extravagance de la pensée n’a plus de sens dans un monde extravagant.
« Qu’elle était belle, l’indifférence, dans un monde qui ne l’était pas, dans un monde différent, convulsif et contradictoire, avec des enjeux et des passions! Du coup, l’indifférence de l’esprit devenait elle-même un enjeu et une passion, diamétralement opposée. Elle pouvait anticiper sur le devenir indifférent du monde et faire événement de cette indifférence. Aujours’hui il est difficile d’être plus apathique, plus indifférent à leur propre sens que les faits eux-mêmes. Notre monde opérationnel est un monde apathique, indifférent à lui-même, dépassionné et d’un ennui mortel. Or, il ne sert à rien d’être dépassionné dans un monde sans passion. Etre désinvolte dans un monde désinvesti n’a pas de sens. C’est ainsi qu’on se retrouve orphélin. » (p. 28)
« La pensée radicale n’est jamais dépressive – contresens total. […] Le sens, lui, est toujours malheureux, l’analyse est par définition malheureuse, puisqu’elle est née de la désillusion critique. Mais la langue, elle, est heureuse, même si elle désigne un monde sans illusion et sans espoir. Ce serait, même là, la définition d’une pensée radicale: une intelligence sans espoir, mais une forme heureuse. » (p. 29-30)
La langue et l’écriture sont l’illusion vivante du sens.
« Des idées, tout le monde en a, et plus qu’il n’en faut. Ce qui compte, c’est la singularité poétique de l’analyse. Cela seul, ce witz, cette spiritualité de la langue, peut justifier d’écrire, et non la misérable objectivité critique des idées. » (p. 30)
« De toute façon, il vaut mieux une analyse désespérante dans une langue heureuse qu’une analyse optimiste dans une langue désespérante d’ennui et démoralisante de platitude, comme c’est le plus souvent le cas. L’ennui formel que secrète cette pensée idéaliste des valeurs, ou cette pensée voluntariste de la culture, est le signe secret de son désespoir – non par rapport au monde, mais par rapport à son propre discours. C’est là qu’est la véritable pensée dépressive, chez ceux qui ne parlent que de dépassement et de transformation du monde, alors qu’ils sont incapables de transfigurer leur propre langue. » (p. 31)
La pensée radicale coïncide avec l’usage radical de la langue. Elle ne déchiffre pas. Elle est supra-conductrice de l’illusion et du non-sens.
« De toute façon, s’il veut parler d’illusion, le langage doit se faire lui-même illusion. S’il veut parler de séduction, il doit se faire séduction. Quant à parler du réel, il ne saurait le faire à proprement parler, car le langage n’est jamais réel. » (p. 33)
Le langage est porteur à son insu d’une pensée radicale.
« La règle absolue, celle de l’échange symbolique, est de rendre ce qui vous a été donné. Jamais moins, toujours plus. La règle absolue de la pensée, c’est de rendre le monde tel qu’il nous a été donné – inintelligible – et si possible un peu plus inintelligible. Un peu plus énigmatique. » (p. 36)

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Bibliografie Lord Northbourne

Every Branch in Me: Essays of the Meaning of Man, Ed. Barry McDonald.

Science and the Myth of Progress, Ed. Merhard M. Zarandi.

Look to the Land, 1940.

Religion in the Modern World, 1963.

Looking back on Progress, 1970.

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Detinãtorul Numelui Suprem (traducere de Radu Iliescu din Faouzi Skali, Traces de lumière)

Se spune cã un om era decis sã obtinã puterea “Numelui Suprem”, Numele Divin secret prin care ar putea actiona asupra întregului univers, punând în operã întreaga sa vointã. Desigur, nu pentru a face ceva rãu, ci pentru ca în sfârsit binele sã poatã domni peste tot fãrã gres.

Acest lucru luã multi ani, petrecuti în posturi si rugãciuni, în privatiuni de tot felul suportate cu rãbdare. Într-o zi, avu sansa sã întâlneascã un om care îi spuse cã dacã mergea în piatã putea sã-l vadã pe omul pe care Dumnezeu îl înzestrase cu acest secret si pe care ar putea sã-l întrebe. Omul nostru, fãrã sã se mai gândeascã sã bea sau sã mãnânce, nu avu alt scop decât sã observe fãrã încetare oamenii care se gãseau în piatã, sperând astfel sã-l poatã ghici pe acela dintre ei care era alesul lui Dumnezeu. Orele trecurã astfel fãrã ca vreun semn sã aparã. Observã totusi o scenã care îl scoase din sãrite si îl fãcu sã regrete si mai mult faptul de a nu fi avut secretul Numelui Divin: un om bãtrân si obosit purtând o legãturã de surcele în spate lovi, din neatentie, un tânãr care trecea. Acesta din urmã fu prins de o mânie violentã si-l bãtu pe bãtrân cu înversunare, nepãsãtor la adresa vârstei si slãbiciunii acestuia. “Ah! dacã as fi avut secretul, îsi spunea cãutãtorul, as fi fãcut imediat dreptate acestui bãtrân pentru toate relele revoltãtoare pe care le-a îndurat!”

Ziua se termina si omul nostru era mai amar ca niciodatã. Mai târziu, avu din nou sansa sã-l întâlneascã pe sfântul ce pãrea sã-l cunoascã pe detinãtorul inaccesibilului “Nume”. Îi spuse fãrã gres deceptia sa si-i povesti cã aceastã zi, cea mai lipsitã de roade dintre toate, îl pusese în situatia de a fi martor al unei scene care-l revoltase.

Sfântul îi spuse atunci cã dacã nu-l vãzuse pe cel pe care-l cãuta, singura vinã apartinea cãutãtorului. “Detinãtorul secretului suprem, o, prietene, nu era altul decât acest bãtrân pe care l-ai vãzut acceptând încercarea fãrã sã reactioneze.”

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Bibliografia Julius Evola

Arte astratta. Posizione teoretica, Roma (Zürich, Maglione e Strini ed., col. "Dada"), 1920. Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 3, 1977, 1992.

Saggi sull'idealismo magico, Todi-Roma, Atanrr, 1925. Genova, Alkaest, 1981. Genova, I Dioscuri, 1989.

L'uomo come potenza. I tantra nella loro metafisica e nei loro metodi di autorealizzazione magica, Todi-Roma, Atanrr, 1925. Roma, Mediterranee, 1988.

L'individuo e il devenire del mondo (Ultra, n: 5-6, 12/1925), Roma, Libreria di scienze e lettere, 1926. Carmagnola, Arthos, 1976, con prefacio de R. Melchionda sobre la filosofia de Evola en relacisn al resto de su obra y nota bibliografica de R. del Ponte.

Teoria dell'individuo assoluto, Torino, Bocca, 1927. Roma, Mediterranee, 1973, 1980, 1988, 1995.

Imperialismo pagano. Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano, con una appendice sulle reazioni di parte guelfa, Todi-Roma, Atanrr, 1928. Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978.

Introduzione alla magia quale scienza dell'io, Roma, Gruppo di Ur, 1927-29 (artmculos aparecidos en la revista Ur, convertida en Krur en 1929). Roma, Bocca, 1955-56. Roma, Mediterranee, 1971, 1980-81.

Fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto, Torino, Bocca, 1930. Roma, Mediterranee, col. Orizzonti dello spirito, n: 16, 1974 (292 pp.), 1989, 1996 (296 pp.). Incluye referencias bibliograficas e indice.

La tradizione ermetica nei suoi simboli, nella sua dottrina e nella sua "ars regia", Bari, Laterza, 1931, 1948. Roma, Mediterranee, col. Orizzonti dello spirito, n: 8, 1971, 1984, 1991.

Maschera e volto dello spiritualismo contemporaneo. Analisi critica delle principali correnti moderne verso il sovrasensibile, Torino, Bocca, 1932. Bari, Laterza, 1949. Roma, Mediterranee, col. Orizzonti dello spirito, n: 6, 1971 (revisada y ampliada), 220 pp., 1983, 1990 (224 pp.).

Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, Milano, Hoepli, 1934. Milano, Bocca, 1951. Roma, Mediterranee, col. Orizzonti dello spirito, 1969, 1974, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1993 (464 pp.). En la ed. revisada y aumentada de 1969 se suprimis definitivamente el capmtulo Il simbole polare e l'altezza.

Tre aspetti del problema ebraico, Roma, Mediterranee, 1936. Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978, 1994.

Il mistero del graal e la tradizione ghibellina dell'impero, Bari, Laterza, 1937.

Il mito del sangue. Genesi del razzismo, Milano, Hoepli, 1937, 1942. Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978. Borzano, SeaR, 1995.

Sintesi di dottrina della raza, Milano, Hoepli, 1941. Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978.

Indirizzi per una educazione razziale, Napoli, Conte, 1941. Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1979, 1994.

Die Arische Lehre von Kampf und Sieg, Wien, Anton Schroll Verlag, 1941.

Gli ebrei hanno volute questa guerra, Roma, La Vita Italiana, 1942 (en colaboracisn con A. Luchini, P. Pellicano y G. Preziosi).

La dottrina del risveglio. Saggio sull'ascesi buddhista, Bari, Laterza, 1943.

Lo yoga della potenza. Saggio sui tantra: lo yoga del sesso, Milano, Bocca, 1949. Roma, Mediterranee, 1968, 1972, 1981, 1994.

Orientamenti, Roma, Imperium, 1950. Milano, Ordine Nuovo, 1958 (ed. pirata). Padova, Argo, 1964 (ed. pirata). Roma, Europa, 1971 (con prefacio del autor), 1975, 1977 (ambas con prefacio de G. del Ninno).

Gli uomini e le rovine, Roma, Ed. dell'Ascia, 1953. Roma, Volpe, 1967 (revisada y aumentada), 1972, con cuatro apindices iniditos, originalmente aparecidos en Il Borghese (Roma): Il mito Marcuse (27/6/1958), L'infatuazione maoista (18/7/1968), Quelli della "contestazione totale" (5/9/1968) y Taby dei nostri tempi: la "classe lavoratrice" (6/3/1969. Incluido en La questione sociale, 1979), 1978.

Metafisica del sesso, Roma, Atanrr, 1958. Roma, Mediterranee, col. Orizzonti dello spirito, n: 3, 1969 (413 pp., con 16 ilustraciones), 1976, 1982, 1988, 1994 (352 pp., con introduccisn de Fausto Antonini). La ed. de 1958 incluye dos artmculos que no volvieron a aqadirse posteriormente: Narcisismo femminile e complesso d'inferiorità (Roma, 11/1/1951) y Deviate dall'educazione le ragazze anglossasioni (Roma, 12/1/1951. Incluido en Il problema della donna, 1977.

L'operaio nel pensiero di Ernst Jünger, Roma, Avio-Armando, col. I Problemi della pegagogia, n: 52, 1960, Roma, Volpe, 1974. Reed. en Roma, Ordine Nuovo (11/1960), con el tmtulo L'"Operaio" nel pensiero di Jünger.

Cavalcare la tigre, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1961. Milano, All'insegna del pesce d'oro, col. La Primula rossa, n: 2, 1971 (229 pp.), 1973, 1981. Roma, Mediterranee, 1996 (con introduccisn de Stefano Zecchi).

Il cammino del cinabro, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, col. "La primula rosa", 1963, 1972.

Il fascismo. Saggio di una analisi critica dal punto di vista della destra, Roma, Volpe, 1964. Edicisn revisada y aumentada, con el tmtulo Il fascismo visto dalla destra, con in appendice "note sul Terzo Reich", Roma, Volpe, 1970, 1974, 1979. Roma, Il Settimo Sigillo, 1989.

L'arco e la clava, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1968, 1971 (esta ultima con prefacio de G. Benn). Roma, Mediterranee, 1996 (nueva edicisn revisada y ampliada, 296 pp., con introduccisn de Giorgio Galli).

Rabga blanda. Composizioni 1916-1922, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1969. Amsterdam, Ed. di Sole nero, 1979.

I saggi di "Bilychnis", Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1970, 1987.

I saggi della "nuova antologia", Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1970, 1982. Dos artmculos originalmente aparecidos en Roma, Nuova Antologia: Americanismo e Bolscevismo, n: 1371, 5/1929, Incluido en Il ciclo si chiude - Americanismo e Bolscevismo, 1929-1969, 1991.

Gerarchia e democrazia, Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1970, 1977, 1987. Contiene dos artmculos del autor aparecidos originalmente en Lo Stato, Roma: Il problema della decadenza (Metafisica della rivoluzione. Il problema della decadenza, IX, n: 5, 5/1938. Incluido en Lo Stato (1934-1943), 1995), y Sull'essenza e la funzione attuale dello spirito aristocratico (XII, n: 10, 10/1941, p. 368. Incluido en Monarchia, Aristocrazia, Tradizione, 1986. Incluido en Lo Stato (1934-1943), 1995), y uno de Reni Guinon (id.): Suggestioni sociali, democrazia ed "ilite" (VII, n: 4, 4/1936), ademas de nota introductoria (en las ed. de 1977 y 1987) y advertencia del Gruppo di Ar. 46 pp.

Note sulla monarchia, Palermo, Thule, 1972. Incluye dos artmculos del Meridiano d'Italia posteriormente incluidos en Monarchia, Aristocrazia, Tradizione, 1986.

Citazioni, Roma, Volpe, 1972.

Il taoismo, Roma, Mediterranee, 1972. Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 22, 1990. Roma, Mediterranee, 1995 (edicisn ampliada, con nuevos textos de 1923 y 1959), con introduccisn de Silvio Vita. Se trata del prefacio del autor al Tao-Te-King: Lao-Tze, Il libro del principio e della sua azione, Milano, Ceschina, 1959.

Meditazioni delle vette, La Spezia, Ed. del Tridente, 1974, 1979, 1986. Prefacio de R. del Ponte (pp. 11-19). Contiene dieciocho artmculos publicados entre 1930 y 1955. Las ediciones de 1979 y 1986 incluyen el artmculo Tempesta sul Monte Rosa (Roma, 30/8/1955). La edicisn de 1986 incluye Dove regna il demone delle vette (Il Laboro d'Italia, n: 220, 16/9/1927.

Ricognizioni. Uomini e problemi, Roma, Mediterranee, 1974, 1985 (248 pp.).

Diorama filosofico. Problemi dello spirito nell'etica fascista. Antologia della pagina speciale di "regime fascista" diretta da Julius Evola. Vol. 1: 1934-1935, Roma, Europa, 1974. VOL. 2: 1936-1943, Roma, Europa, 1978.

Diario 1943-1944 (Il Popolo Italiano, 14/3/1957 a 24/3/1957), Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, Quaderni Evola, n: 1, 1975, pp. 8-14. Scaniano, SeaR, 1989. Serie de artmculos publicados originalmente con el tmtulo Con Mussolini al Quartier Generale di Hitler.

Il significato di roma per lo spirito "olimpico" germanice (appendix: sull'antico ideale umano ariano) (La Rassegna Italiana, XXV, n: 294, 11/1942), Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, Quaderni Evola, n: 2, 1975).

Prospective sui "mitti" della spiritualita eroica (Atti di III Congresso di Studi Romani, Roma, 1933), Palermo, Thule, 1975, 1989.

Psicologia criminale ebraica (La Difesa della Razza, 20/7/1939), San Marino, Sentinella d'Italia, 1976, 1983.

Superamento del romanticismo (Vita Nuova, n: 1, 1/1931, y n: 2, 2/1931), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 1, 1976. Incluido en Scritti sull'arte d'avanguardia.

Autodifesa (L'Elocuenza, n: 11-12, 11/1951), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 2, 1976.

Etica aria (1942-1943), Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, Quaderni Evola, n: 3, 1976. Roma, Europa, 1987, 1992.

La razze e il mito delle origini di Roma, Monfalcone-San Marino, Sentinella d'Italia, 1977.

Considerazioni sulla guerra occulta, Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, Quaderni Evola, n: 4, 1977.

La torre, Milano, Il Falco, 1977.

Ultimi scritti, Napoli, Controcorrente, 1977.

La tradizione di Roma, Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1977.

Il problema della donna, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 5, 1977.

L'"operaio" e le scogliere di marmo (Bibliografma Fascista, XVIII, 3/1943). Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1977, con nota introductoria. Incluido en Esplorazioni e disamine. Gli escritti di "Bibliografia Fascista", vol. II: 1940-XVI - 1943-XIX, 1995.

La via della realizzazione di si secondo i misteri di Mithra, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 4, 1977.

Due imperatori, Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1977.

Simboli della tradizione occidentale, Carmagnola, Arthos, 1977 (152 pp. + XII), 1979, 1988, con prefacio y nota bibliografica de Renato del Ponte.

Citazioni sulla monarchia, Palermo, Thule, 1978.

La religione di Cesare, Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978.

Cultura e politica, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 6, 1978.

Il nihilismo attivo di federico Nietzsche, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 8, 1978.

Il piano comunista dell'insurrezione armata (La Vita Italiana, XXVII, n: 321, 12/1939), Carmagnola, Arthos, 1979.

Saggi di dottrina politica, Sanremo, Casabianca, 1979. Genova, I Dioscuri, 1989. Contiene veintiocho articulos aparecidos en La Vita Italiana, Lo Stato, Il Regime Fascista, Vita Nuova, Rassegna Italiana, Europa Nazione y Pagina Libere entre 1930 y 1958. Incluye nota bibliografica, notas a pie de pagina y un apindice de R. del Ponte sobre G. Preziosi.

Movimenti antimoderni e ritorni alla metafisica: Reni Guinon (de Bilychnis, 7/1930), Roma, Perez, 1979.

Lo stato, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 9, 1979.

Europa una: forma e presuposti, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 10, 1979.

La questione sociale, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 11, 1979.

La satira politica di trilussa, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 12, 1980.

Scienza ultima, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 13, 1980.

Mètaphysique de la guerre, Milano, Archè, col. "Cahiers de l'unicorne", n: 6, 1980.

Lo zen, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 15, 1981.

Les symboles héroiques de la tradition romaine, Milano, 1981.

Il nuovo mito germanico del "terzo regno" (Roma, Politica, XIV, n: 103-104, 6/1932), Padova, Il Corallo, 1981.

Spengler e il tramonto dell'occidente, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 14, 1981.

I tempi e la storia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 16, 1982.

"Civiltà" americana, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 17, 1983.

Gli ebrei e la matematica, Monfalcone-Carmagnola, Sentinella d'Italia, 1983. Incluido en Tre aspetti del problema ebraico, Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1978, 1994.

L'orden della Corona di Ferro, Pontremoli, Centro Studi Evoliani, Arthos, n: 2, 1/1973. Trad. espaqola: La orden de la corona de hierro, Barcelona, Alternativa, 1983.

Orient et Occident. Recueil complet des textes écrits pour la revue internationale "East and West" fondée et dirigée par le professeur G. Tucci, Milano, Archè, col. "Bibliothhque de l'unicorne", n: 25, 1982.

Scritti sula massoneria, Roma, Il Settimo Sigillo, 1984.

Un maestro dei tempi moderni: Reni Guinon, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 19, 1984.

Filosofia, etica e mistica del razzismo, Monfalcone, Sentinella d'Italia, 1985.

La "forza rivolucionaria" di Roma, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 18, 1985.

I "placebo", Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 20, 1986.

Monarchia, aristocrazia, tradizione, San Remo, Casabianca & Mizar, 1986. Borzano, SeaR, 1995. Incluye, entro otros, el artmculo Il carattere sacro della regalità (Roma, La Nobilità della Stirpe, II, n: 1, 31/1/1932).

Gli articoli de la "vita italiana" durante il periodo bellico, Treviso, Centro Studi Tradizionali di Treviso, 1988.

Lettere a girolamo comi (1934-1962), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 21, 1988.

Dal crepusculo all'oscuramento della tradizione nipponica, Treviso, Centro Studi Tradizionali di Treviso, 1989.

Polemica sulla metafisica indiana, Genova, Il Basilisco, 1987.

Il matriarcato nell'opera di J. J. Bachofen, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 23, 1990, 14 pp.

I ciclo si chiude. Americanismo e bolscevismo (1929-1969), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 24, 1991. Incluido en I saggi della "Nuova Antologia", Padova, Ed. di Ar, 1970, 1982.

Lettere di julius evola a Tristan Tzara (1919-1923), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 25, 1991.

Forme e conditions prialables de l'uniti europienne, Bruxelles, Centro Studi Evoliani, 1992.

Il "genio d'Israel". L'azione distruttice dell'ebraismo, Catania, Il Cinabro, 1992, 300 pp. Contiene 31 articulos originalmente aparecidos en Roma, La Vita Italiana, entre 1937 y 1941.

Il problema di Oriente e Occidente (estrati sul tema da tre libri), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 26, 1992.

Fenomenologia della souversione. L'antitradizione in sritti politici del 1933-1970, Borzano, SeaR, 1993.

Scritti sull'arte d'avanguardia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Biblioteca Evoliana, n: 2, 1994.

Esplorazioni e disamine. Gli escritti di "Bibliografia fascista", VOL. I: 1934-IX - 1939-XIV, Parma, Ed. all'insegna del Veltro, 1994.

Esplorazioni e disamine. Gli escritti di "Bibliografia fascista", VOL. II: 1940-XVI - 1943-XIX, Parma, Ed. all'insegna del Veltro, 1995.

Lo stato (1934-1943), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Biblioteca Evoliana, n: 3, 1995.

Lettere de Julius Evola a Benedetto Croce (1925-1933), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 28, 1995.

La tragedia della Guardia di Ferro Romena: Codreanu, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, Quaderni di testi evoliani, n: 29, 1996.

Carattere, Catania, Il Cinabro, 1996.

Lettere 1955-1974, Finale Emilia, La Terra degli Avi, 1996.

La navidad solar (La Difesa della razza, IV, n: 4, 20/12/1940, pp. 8-11).

Valore dell’occultismo nella cultura contemporanea (de Bilychnis, Roma, aqo XVI, fasc. XI, 11/1927, p. 250 ff.), Genova, Il Basilisco.


Articole reeditate ale lui Julius Evola

“Par-delà Nietzsche” (Firenze-Roma, 900 - Cahiers d'Italia et d'Europa, n: 2, 1926-27), en Totaliti, n: 21-22, 10/1985.

“La spiritualità pagana nel Medioevo "Cattolico" (Bologna, Vita Nuova, 7/1932 y 11/1932).

“Spiritualiti paienne dans le Moyen Age "Catholique" en Hamsa”, Paris, n: 5, 1976. Reed. en Kalki, n: 3, 1987.

“Incontri. A proposito di un manifesto realista” (Roma, Il Regime Fascista, VIII, 5/2/1933), en Berto Ricci: La rivoluzione fascista, Milano (Barbarossa), 1996.

“Virtus e Felicitas” (Roma, Il Regime Fascista, X, 30/12/1935).

“Origini sacre e origini profane” (Roma, Il Regime Fascista, XIV, 5/11/1939), en Pericle Perali - Julius Evola: Sul problema delle origini di Roma.

“Sulla risoluzione ario-romana dell'Italia fascista y Sul contributo della romanità per la nuova Germania”, (Il Regime Fascista, 16 de noviembre de 1941), en Nicola Cospito y Hans Werner Neulen (ed.), Julius Evola nei documenti segreti del Terzo Reich, Roma (Europa), 1986, pp. 45-57 y 63-68.

“Razza ed ascesi” (La Rassegna Italiana, XXV, n: 287, 4/1942).

“Les armes de la guerre occulte” (Paris-Genève: Contre-Rivolution, n: 3-4, 1938), en Totaliti, n: 20.

“La technique de la subversion” (Paris-Genève: Contre-Rivolution, n: 12, 1938), en Totaliti, n: 20.

“La razza e la filosofia della vita” (La Difesa della Razza, 5/12/1940), en Julius Evola, Ferdinand Clauss Ludwing, Wilhelm Stapel y Othmar Spann, Orizonti del razzismo europeo, Padova, Il Corallo, 1981.

“La vera "contestazione" h a Destra: L'uomo di vetta”. Intervista di Gianfranco de Turris, (Il Conciliatore, XIX, n: 1, 1970), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Incontro con Julius Evola”. Intervista di Gianfranco de Turris, (ll Conciliatore, XI, n: 11, 11/1970, p. 812. Reed. en Torino, Planeta, n: 44, 1/1972, p. 135), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973, 205 pp. Incluye bibliografma (p. 177-205).

“Perchi la magia?”. Intervista di Gianfranco de Turris, (Torino, Planeta, n: 47, 7/1972, p. 8), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Per Adriano Romualdi” (L'Italiano, XIV, n: 12-13, 8/1973), en Pino Romualdi (a cura di): Ricordo di Adriano, Cassino, 1974.
“Conversazione sensa complessi con l'ultimo Ghibellino”. Intervista di Enrico de Boccard, en Roma, Playmen, 2/1970, pp. 15-22. Reproducido en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Magia sessuale et vampirismo sessuale nella China antica” (V.T., II, n: 8, 10/1972).

“Natalis Invicti” (Il Regime Fascista, 30/12/1933).

“Valori eterni e cricce intellettuali”. Intervista di Fausto Gianfranceschi e Giampiero Pellegrini, (Roma, Lo Specchio, n: 8, 20/2/1972), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“A colloquio con Evola, uno scrittore al di fuori delle consorterie mafiose”. Intervista di Nino Guglielmi (Roma, Il Giornale d'Italia, 15/7/1972, p. 3) en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Abus de confiance” (carta), en Paris, Nouvelle Ecole, n: 20, 9/1972, p. 117.

“Le interviste di "Arthos": Julius Evola”. Intervista di Sergio Bonifazi (Arthos, Genova, n: 1, 9/1972, p. 6), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Il Caso di Filippo il Bello” (Arthos, Genova, n: 11, 1/1976).

“Il nuovo spiritualismo e la psicanalisi in una intervista con Julius Evola”. Intervista di Amalia Baccelli (La Donna e la Fiamma, Roma, n: 2-3, 12/1972, 1/1973), en Ommagio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973.

“Eros e "repressioni" (Civilt`, II, n: 4, 1/1974).

“Les origines de la subversion” (Raido, Genova, n: 1, 3/1976), en Totaliti, n: 21-22, 10/1985.

“Moi, Tzara et Marinetti”. Entretien inidit (L'Italia settimanale, n: 23, 1994).

“Gerarchia tradizionale e umamismo moderno” (La Torre, n: 3, 1/3/1930, y n: 4, 15/3/1930).

“L'infezione psicanalista” (Il Conciliatore, 15/11/1970).

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Despre natura ascunsã (traducere de Radu Iliescu din Faouzi Skali, Traces de lumière)

Se spune cã un sfânt era în proximitatea Prezentei divine atunci când auzi o voce spunând: “Dacã as dezvãlui oamenilor unele din stãrile tale interioare, acestia ar avea pentru tine mai putinã consideratie.”

Sfântul, întelegând cã e vorba de o viziune, nu se lãsã si spuse: “Dacã as dezvãlui oamenilor adevãrata Ta Compasiune, cei mai multi dintre ei, linistiti, s-ar îndepãrta de Tine.”

Atunci vocea, emanând de la Prezenta divinã, concluzionã astfel acest dialog intim: “Nu spune nimic si nici Eu nu voi spune nimic!”

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Bibliography Joseph Epes Brown

The sacred pipe: Black Elk's account of the seven rites of the Oglala Sioux. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, New York: MJF Books, 1993, 1996, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982.

The spiritual legacy of the American Indian. Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1964, New York: Crossroad, 1982.

Animals of the soul: sacred animals of the Oglala Sioux. Rockport, Mass.: Element, 1992, 1997, 1998.

With Emily Cousins. Teaching spirits: understanding Native American religious traditions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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Charles Hoy Fort, Book of the Damned, (breviar de idei)

01. Ar trebui ca cineva sã organizeze o procesiune a evenimentelor pe care Stiinta le-a exclus. [În fapt, chiar cu asta se ocupa volumul lui Charles Hoy Fort: o extenuantã procesiune a unor inexplicabile fenomene.]

02. Diferentele pozitive sunt iluzorii. Ce este apa? Ce este pãmântul? Existã în apã o cantitate importantã de pãmânt, iar în pãmânt existã apã. Clasificãm, vedem diferente acolo unde nu existã, le inventãm chiar, în loc sã admitem cã trãim într-un intercontinuous nexus.

03. Nu este nimic de dovedit, pentru cã nimic nu poate fi cu adevãrat demonstrat.

04. Toate stiintele încep prin a încerca sã defineascã ceva. În fapt, nimic nu a fost definit, pentru cã nimic nu poate fi definit.

05. În topografia intelectului, ceea ce numim cunoastere este ignorantã la adãpost de hohotele de râs.

16. Noi nu mai credem. Acceptãm.

17. Darwin a spus cã cel mai potrivit (the fittest) supravietuieste. Ce înseamnã “cel mai potrivit”? Peste tot slãbiciunea si stupiditatea supravietuieste. Singurul lucru precis care poate fi enuntat despre ce a vrut Darwin sã spunã este cã supravietuitorii supravietuiesc.

18. Trãim în Continuitate (intercontinuous nexus) si pentru a ne feri de punctele de îmbinare ale ei, preferãm deliberat sã ne uitãm la extreme. Cum sã distingi între animal si vegetal în speciile de infusoria? Asa cã mai bine te uiti la hipopotami si la violete. Numai un bou ar trimite un buchet de hipopotami la o doamnã.

19. Columb nu a demonstrat cu adevãrat cã Pãmântul este rotund.

20. Asteptãm de la orice stiintã sã fie o expresie a realitãtii. Pentru a fi realã, o stiintã trebuie sã localizeze universalul, încercare la care toate esueazã optând pentru ceva în detrimentul restului, pe care îl exclude, îl damneazã, îl ignorã. Desi toate fenomenele tind cãtre Absolut, stiintele noastre se zbat iremediabil în Intermediatitate.

21. Este usor de vãzut cã cea mai mare parte a stiintei din secolul XIX a fost doar o reactie la dogma teologicã, si acest lucru are foarte putine în comun cu Adevãrul.

22. Nimic nu are identitate în sine. Orice poate fi “identificat” cu altceva, totul e sã-si dea silinta un om de stiintã.

23. Cea mai mare problemã cu eficienta este cã mai devreme sau mai târziu devine excesivã.

24. Se spune cã gravitatia este atractia tuturor lucrurilor proportionalã cu masa si invers proportionalã cu pãtratul distantei. Masa ar însemna interatractia care tine împreunã particulele finale, în cazul în care particulele finale chiar existã. Asadar, pânã când vor fi descoperite aceste particule, doar unul din termenii acestei expresii supravietuieste: masa este atractie. Dar distanta este doar o extensie a masei, doar dacã nu cumva cineva sustine cã existã un vacuum absolut între planete, pozitie împotriva cãreia se pot aduce multe informatii. Pe de altã parte, gravitatia nu poate fi explicatã decât ca fiind o atractie. Ce rãmâne în cele din urmã din definitie? Gravitatia este gravitatia tuturor gravitatiilor proportional cu gravitatia si invers proportional cu cu pãtratul gravitatiei… A defini un lucru prin sine însusi nu este cu adevãrat o definitie…

25. Autoritatea stiintificã tine foarte mult de hipnoza exercitatã de câtiva oameni asupra unui public inert.

26. Specia noastrã e cantonatã pe o insulã minusculã într-un ocean pe care nu l-am strãbãtut niciodatã. Putem prezice din când în când aparitia unor vase cu traseu mai mult sau mai putin regulat. Primim uneori datoritã valurilor detritusuri din materii necunoscute cu care nu stim ce sã facem, si pe care le clasãm imediat în functie de ceea ce se gãseste pe insula noastrã…

27. Stiinta de azi e superstitia de mâine. Stiinta de mâine – superstitia de azi.

28. Stiinta e ca o broascã testoasã care pretinde a cuprinde sub caparacea ei Totul.

29. În Intermediatitatea în care ne aflãm, nimic mai van ca pretentia de a fonda o “stiintã exactã”.

30. Orice poate fi exprimat prin orice limbaj: orice roman are formula lui chimicã, orice reactie magneticã poate fi povestitã romantic, orice eveniment istoric poate fi redus la niste termeni algebrici. Definitia Intermediatitãtii: unicitatea întregului în aproximativitate (oneness of allness in quasiness).

31. Stiinta ignorã nonsalant ceea ce nu intrã în posibilitãtile ei de explicare. Parabolã: stiinta este o autostradã frumos îngrijitã. Deoparte si de alta – junglã. Stiinta priveste numai înainte!

32. Rãspunsul unui intermediatist la toate întrebãrile: uneori da si uneori nu. Da si nu. Orice este, dar de asemeni nu este.

33. Existã un Dominant al fiecãrei epoci, care serveste de explicatie primordialã sau chiar de passe-partout. Fiecare Dominant este gelos.

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Bibliography Joscelyn Godwin

Robert Fludd. Hermetic Philosopher and Surveyor of Two Worlds, London: Thames & Hudson, 1979.

Athanasius Kircher.A Renaissance Man and the Quest for Lost Knowledge, London: Thames & Hudson, 1979.

Mystery Religions in the Ancient World, London: Thames & Hudson, 1981.

Harmonies of Heaven and Earth. The Spiritual Dimension of Music from Antiquity to the Avant-Garde, London: Thames & Hudson, 1987.

Music and the Occult. French Musical Philosophies 1750-1950, Rochester: University of Rochester Press/London: Boydell & Brewer, 1995.

The Mystery of the Seven Vowels in Theory and Practice, Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1991.

Arktos. The Polar Myth in Science, Symbolism, and Nazi Survival, Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1993.

The Theosophical Enlightenment, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

The Pagan Dream of the Renaissance, Grand Rapids: Phanes Press/London: Thames & Hudson, 2002.

The Real Rule of Four, New York: The Disinformation Company, 2004.

Articole
“Boethius’ Three Musicians.” Studies in Comparative Religion 4 (1970): 246-50.

“Spiritual Currents in Music.” Studies in Comparative Religion 5 (1971): 110-25.

“The Renaissance Flute.” The Consort 28 (1972): 70-81.

“Robert Fludd on the Lute and Pandora.” Lute Society Journal 15 (1973): 11-19.

“Robert Fludd’s Symbolic Recorder.” American Recorder 14/1 (1973): 17.

“Instruments in Robert Fludd’s Utriusque cosmi...historia.” Galpin Society Journal 26 (1973): 2-14.

“The Survival of the Theorbo Principle.” Journal of the Lute Society of America 6 (1973): 4-16.

“Eccentric Forms of the Guitar.” Journal of the Lute Society of America 7 (1974): 90-102.

“Early Mendelssohn and Late Beethoven.” Music and Letters 55 (1974): 272-85.

“Playing from Original Notation.” Early Music 2 (1974): 15-19.

“Quest and Protest in Popular Songs.” The Golden Blade 26 (1974): 96-106.

“Where is Music Going?” The Golden Blade 27 (1975): 122-36.

“Mains divers acors: some instrument collections of the Ars Nova.” Early Music 5 (1977): 148-59.

“Layers of Meaning in the Magic Flute.” Musical Quarterly 65 (1979): 471-92.

“The Revival of Speculative Music.” Musical Quarterly 67 (1982): 373-86; German translation in Musiktherapeutische Umschau 7 (1986): 25-41.

“Tolkien and the Primordial Tradition.” Temenos 3 (1983): 27-37.

“The Rosicrucian Event in Perspective.” Journal of Rosicrucian Studies 1 (1983): 18-22.

“Pythagoreans, Today?” Homage To Pythagoras: Lindisfarne Letter 14 (1983): 135-42.

“The Golden Chain of Orpheus: a Survey of Musical Esotericism in the West.” Temenos 4 (1984): 7-25; 5 (1984): 211-239. Reprinted in Sudhamahi Regunathan, Song of the Spirit... the World of Sacred Music (Delhi: Tibet House, 2000): 71-92.

“Musical Alchemy: the Work of Composer and Listener.” Temenos 6 (1985): 57-75. (Revised version in Harmonies of Heaven and Earth)

“Hearing Secret Harmonies.” The American Theosophist 73 (1985): 182-95. (Revised version in Harmonies of Heaven and Earth)

“A Background for Michael Maier’s Atalanta Fugiens (1617).” Hermetic Journal 29 (1985): 5-10.

“Priests, Professors and Gurus.” Gnosis 2 (1986): 35-8.

“Saint-Yves d’Alveydre and the Agarthian Connection.” Hermetic Journal 32 (1986): 24-34; 33 (1986): 31-8.

Foreword to The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library, ed. D. Fideler and K.S. Guthrie. Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987.

“Mystery Religions.” Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. 10. New York: Scribners, 1987.

“La genèse de l’Archéomètre de Saint-Yves d’Alveydre.” L’Initiation (Paris), no.2 of 1988: 60-71; no.4 of 1988: 153-166. (In French) Condensed version in English: “The Creation of a Universal System: Saint-Yves d’Alveydre and his Archeometer.” Alexandria 1 (1991): 229-249.

“Facing the Traditionalists: an Approach to René Guénon and his Successors.” Gnosis 7 (1988): 23-27.

“H.P.B., Dorjeff, and the Mongolian Connection.” Theosophical History (London) 2/7 (1988): 253-60.

Foreword to D.P. Walker, La Magie Spirituelle et Angélique de Ficin à Campanella. Paris: Albin Michel, 1988. [In French]

Foreword to Iamblichus, The Exhortation to Philosophy. Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1988.

“Kircher and the Occult.” In Athanasius Kircher und seine Beziehungen zur gelehrten Europa seiner Zeit (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1988): 17-36 and plates.

"Prelude to a Fugue. Reflections on Beethoven's Grosse Fuge, Opus 33." Temenos 9 (1989), 69-77.

The Beginnings of Theosophy in France [40-page monograph]. London: Theosophical History Centre, 1989.

“The Hidden Hand.” Part I: “The Provocation of the Hydesville Phenomena.” Theosophical History III/2 (1990): 35-43. Part II: “The Brotherhood of Light.” Theosophical History III/3 (1990): 66-76. Part III: “The Parting of East and West.” Theosophical History III/4 (1990): 107-117. Part IV: “The Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor.” Theosophical History III/5 (1991): 137-148.

“Hargrave Jennings.” Hermetic Journal 1991: 49-77.

37."Opera and the Amorous Initiation." Temenos 12 (1991), 129-140.

“Schwaller de Lubicz, les Veilleurs et la connexion nazie.” Politica Hermetica 5 (1991), 101-108.

Foreword to Basarab Nicolescu, Science, Meaning, and Evolution. NY: Parabola Books, 1991.

“The Lessons of History.” The Cerealogist 6 (1992): 14-15.

“A Behemist Circle in Victorian England.” The Hermetic Journal 1992: 48-71.

“Speculative Music: the Numbers behind the Notes.” A Compendium of Contemporary Musical Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) vol. 1: 246-261.

“Many Futures.” Voices on the Threshold of Tomorrow, ed. George and Trisha Feuerstein (Wheaton: Quest Books, 1993): 34-36.

Foreword to Antoine Faivre, The Golden Fleece and Alchemy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993.

“Mentalism and the Cosmological Fallacy.” Alexandria II (1994): 195-204.

Foreword to Paul Johnson, The Masks of the Masters. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994.

“Annals of the Invisible College.”

“The Hermetic Tradition.” Lapis 1 (1995): 39-41.

“Zoroaster.” Lapis 2 (1996): 37-39.

“Orpheus.” Lapis 3 (1996): 29-31.

“Pythagoras.” Lapis 4 (1997): 41-43.

“The Platonic Tradition.” Lapis 5 (1997): 31-33.

“Roman Mysteries.” Lapis 6 (1998): 41-43.

“Gnosis and Gnosticism.” Lapis 7 (1998): 39-41.

“The Negative Theology.” Lapis 8 (1999): 59-61.

“The Cathedrals.” Lapis 9 (1999): 51-53.

“The Arts of the Imagination.” Lapis 10 (1999): 71-74.

“New Gods.” Lapis 11 (2000): 00-00

"The Philosopher's Dilemma." Lapis 12 (2000)

"The Inward Way." Lapis 13 (2000)

"The Religion of Art." Lapis 14 (2001)

"Wise Men from the East."

“Il tempo trasformato in spazio. Riflessioni sull’occhio, sull’orecchio e sulla circolarità del tempo.”
L’Ascolto del Tempo. Musiche inudibili e ambiente ritmico, ed. A. Mayr, A. Colimberti, and G. Montagano (Florence: MP x2 Editore, 1995): 49-58. (In Italian)

“Athanasius Kircher.” In James Hardin, ed., German Baroque Writers, 1580-1660. (Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 164) (Detroit: Bruccoli Clark Layman, 1996): 185-194.

“The Case Against Reincarnation.” Gnosis 42 (1997): 39-42.

“Taste, Snobbery, and Spiritual Discernment.” Contemporary Music Review 14/3-4 (1997): 47-53.

“Music and the Hermetic Tradition.” In R. van den Broeck and W. J. Hanegraaff, eds., Gnosis and Hermeticism from Antiquity to Modern Times (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998): 183-196.

“Stockhausen’s Donnerstag aus Licht and Gnosticism.” In R. van den Broeck and W. J. Hanegraaff, eds., Gnosis and Hermeticism from Antiquity to Modern Times (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998): 347-358.

“Swastika and Cross: Polar and Solar Symbolism.” Rûna 3 (1998): 8-13.

"Airs and Angels." In BBC Promenade Concerts Programme, 1998: 7-10.

"L'esoterismo evoliano visto dagli Stati Uniti." Studi Evoliani 1998 (1999): 19-25. (In Italian)

“The Deepest of the Rosicrucians. Michael Maier (1569-1622).” In Ralph White, ed., The Rosicrucian Enlightenment Revisited (Hudson: Lindisfarne Books, 1999): 101-123.

“Out of Arctica? Herman Wirth’s Theory of Human Origins.” Rûna 5 (1999): 2-7.

"Lady Caithness and Her Connection with Theosophy." Theosophical History VIII/4 (2000): 127-147.

"The Survival of the Personality, according to Modern Esoteric Teachings." In Ésotérisme, gnoses & imaginaire symbolique. Mélanges offerts à Antoine Faivre (Leuven: Peeters, 2001): 403-413. Also published in German in Gnostika 22 (2002): 26-38.

Foreword to Julius Evola, Men Among the Ruins. Rochester, Vt.: Inner Traditions International, 2002.
"Western Esoteric Tradition." In J. Gordon Melton and Martin Baumann, eds., Religions of the World (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2002), vol. 4: 1414-1418.

"Julius Evola: A Philosopher for the Age of the Titans." Tyr 1 (2002): 127-142.

"Herman Wirth on Folksong." Tyr 2 (2004)

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